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Abstract  
The goal of this paper is to describe and analyze co-production in public private 
partnerships in spatial planning. We will describe one specific case study, the location 
development project Sijtwende on the edge of two municipalities (The Hague and 
Voorburg), on the edge of public and private investments and on the edge of urban 
development and extension of the mobility system. We will elaborate the bottlenecks 
in the cooperation between several actors involved. Furthermore we will look for 
important breakthroughs in the process of collaborative development of the area.  
How was it possible that after a public lock in situation that took more than twenty 
years a private party was able to force a breakthrough? Finally we will deal with the 
question what this case learns us for the management of these complex processes of 
co-production. We will combine theoretical thoughts and empirical insights from our 
in-depth case study in order to find balances in using project management and process 
management strategies for managing complex spatial planning processes. 
 
Key-words: public-private partnership, process management, project management, 
complex decision-making, planning 
  11. Introduction 
 
Our emerging network society is facing an increasingly important need to manage 
inter-organizational relationships. This transition is known as the shift from 
“government” to “governance”. A government is an organization with formal goals 
and tasks, and clear lines of responsibility and accountability. As such, it is 
necessarily hierarchical. Governments as organizations have well-institutionalized 
structures. Governance, in contrast, refers much more to a process of working and to 
joint efforts between different organizations. Because of the complex relationships 
between these organizations, governance is a less formal approach to steering the 
public domain. Classical governmental authority has made way for a more dynamic 
interaction based on interdependence (Castells, 2000).  
Highly developed societies have witnessed an increase in the number of actors in 
planning processes - involving a whole range of interests and perceptions on the 
nature of the problem and the preferred solution. These societies are also seeing the 
emergence of a complex and loosely-coupled set of subsystems that form the 
framework for urban and regional development. Systems consisting of sets of loosely 
coupled subsystems produce highly complex and unpredictable outcomes (Scharpf, 
1997). 
Complexity in network societies is only partly a matter of the cognitive uncertainty 
that comes from the lack of information about a problem or solutions to it. 
Complexity cannot be overcome simply by gathering more information; it is also 
caused by the inherent ambiguity of the problems and the strategic and institutional 
complexity of the interactions involved in the decision-making process itself 
(Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004).  
Problems can be ambiguous, in this sense, when different actors have different views 
on the nature of the problems and the desirability of particular solutions, or the role 
that different actors play. Even if it were possible to gather all the information 
available, we would not know everything because different actors would interpret that 
information differently (Weick, 1995; Noordegraaf, 2000). The result of this 
ambiguity is a lack of agreement on how to define complex problems or evaluate 
possible solutions. The actors need to cooperate if there is to be enough problem-
solving capacity to solve seemingly intractable problems (Teisman, 2001). 
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seem well adapted to the characteristics of a network society (Osborne, 2000). PPPs 
can be described as durable forms of cooperation between public and private actors 
that enable those actors to develop products or services jointly and to share risks, 
costs, and benefits (Klijn & Teisman, 2003). PPP is based on the idea that added value 
can be gained by synergy – a combined effort leading to products that would not be 
achievable for each party acting alone. 
The aim of this paper is to describe and analyse co-production in public-private 
partnerships in the field of spatial planning. We will describe one specific case study, 
namely the Sijtwende development project. This development project lies at three 
interfaces, namely those between: 1) the municipalities of the Hague and Voorburg; 
2) urban development and the development of the mobility system; and 3) public and 
private investment. We will discuss the problems that hinder collaboration between 
the different actors involved and important breakthroughs in the process of 
collaborative development. In this context, we will examine how a private party 
managed to force a breakthrough in a public lock-in situation that lasted over twenty 
years. Finally, we will try to determine what lessons this case holds for the 
management of these complex co-production processes. 
Several research methods were used in this project. For one thing, extensive 
discussions were carried out with the key figures involved in the Sijtwende project. 
The same people were interviewed several times over a period of three years. This 
made it possible to learn about experiences in the collaboration behind the project. 
Secondly, frequent use was made of written sources, such as covenants, contracts, 
minutes and policy documents. By using different research methods (triangulation) 
the researchers were able to obtain a good picture of the public-private co-operation 
process. 
Section 2 will outline a conceptual model for the goal described above. This will 
cover the concepts of complex decision-making, public-private partnership and 
managing urban development processes. Section 3 will discuss in detail the Sijtwende 
case. This was one of the first examples of multiple land use in the Netherlands, 
initiated by private companies and adopted by the government. We will analyse the 
case in Section 4, and draw conclusions in Section 5. 
 
 
  32.  Theoretical concepts of managing public-private partnerships 
 
Historical background of public-private partnerships 
There are different explanations for the emergence of public-private partnerships 
(PPPs). These range in their focus from financial/economic reasons to 
bureaucratic/strategic factors (Osborne, 2000). Budget deficits have played an 
important role in the emergence of PPPs, but do not explain the need for their use  
(Kouwenhoven, 1991, p.79). One important explanation has arisen from the need to 
streamline the interdependence between the government and the private sector. An 
important element in complex decision-making is interdependence between actors. 
Actors may not have all the resources they need to make decisions, and depend, 
therefore, on other actors who do have those resources, which can include money, 
knowledge, permissions or licences. (Teisman, 2001; Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004).  
In several European countries, especially the United Kingdom, budgetary constraints 
have been important motives for looking for new ways to bear the costs of spatial and 
infrastructural investments (Osborne, 2000). During the 1980s, the involvement of the 
private sector in public services in Britain was encouraged through top-down 
initiatives. These government initiatives can be classified as follows: efficiency 
measures aimed at increasing the involvement of private financing and services; the 
introduction of market forces (agencies, for example); and the drafting of contracts 
with the private sector. PPP falls into the first category, as does the “Private Finance 
Initiative” (PFI) announced in 1992. The aim of this initiative was to use private 
capital to finance important infrastructure projects. In the Netherlands, PPPs are 
generally not top-down initiatives; rather, they tend to be products of local 
government decisions. Political and financial-economic factors have played a larger 
role in Great Britain than in the Netherlands. 
  
Managing the blurred borders created by partnerships 
As soon as PPP arrangements are re-created, the border between the public and 
private domains becomes blurred. This inevitably crates tension between the hard core 
of the public domain (public interests and support from citizens) and the hard core of 
the private domain (self-interest and the profit motive). 
Protecting public interests remains an important task of government. It must ensure 
that the parties involved in the public domain do not focus exclusively on their own 
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governments can no longer base their behaviour on a one-sided, top-down approach 
(Teisman, 1995; 2001). In co-production, an organization cannot be a partner and, at 
the same time, a judge who sets the rules for the partnership. These roles must be 
separated and combined to ensure that the government does not end up being the 
judge and jury in its own court. 
 
Complexity as a fact of life in governance 
In a ideal situation, the added value of a PPP is that it safeguards the public interest 
while at the same time giving the partners the chance to invest in preferred solutions 
in a way that is more efficient and more effective than would be possible outside a 
partnership. The traditional steering activities of government, focused on a politically-
defined public interest, now become part of a much more complex network of steering 
activities. In networks, government policies become part of an expanded political 
process that combines aspects of representative and participatory democracy in a way 
that is new and still poorly understood (Edelenbos, 2005).  
This combination can be seen as an engagement of conflicts of interests that emerge 
when none of the parties is in charge. The combination has the structure of a network 
in which parties are interdependent. Co-production and cooperation are the only 
effective way to deal with interdependency (Teisman, 1995, 43). This, however, leads 
to a more complex management situation. The participants are rooted in several 
“home-networks.” Each network has its own basic values and defining beliefs and all 
of these influence the way actors behave in co-production. The tensions that arise 
between conflicting values and beliefs are major obstacles within partnerships.  
 
Inventory of definitions 
An inventory of the different definitions for PPP would reveal what a rich body of 
insight has been built up over the years. The Kenniscentrum PPP (PPP Knowledge 
Centre) (1999) describes PPP as a joint venture in which the government and 
businesses implement a project collectively in a process based on a clear division of 
tasks and risks, while retaining their own identities and responsibilities. This is a 
relatively broad definition of PPP. Savas (2000, 105) defines PPP as “ a joint public-
private arrangement that harnesses - more fully than conventional government 
arrangements do - the different strengths of the two sectors to provide public services 
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government is to “steer” and not to “row”. In Savas's opinion, companies are better 
equipped to take such an approach thanks to their competitive nature and practical 
experience. By combining the strengths of both sectors, added value can be created 
for the benefit of society. Van Ham and Koppenjan (2002, 25) emphasize the 
structured nature of PPP as an alliance. In their view, a partnership can only be said to 
exist if the collaboration takes on the form of an alliance model (this will be discussed 
in more detail later). They define PPP as a form of structured cooperation in 
establishing and running public services (Van Ham and Koppenjan (2000, 22). One 
important aspect of their approach is the attention they devote to two issues: 1) the 
differences between public and private values and aims; and 2) the options for 
abandoning the contractual separation between customer and contractor. Osborne   
(2000, 14) go further and define PPP as a strategic partnership intended to realize the 
broader aims relating to the longer-term issues involved in project and programme 
development. The underlying basis for partnership is the high degree of mutual trust 
and the belief that it offers both partners advantages. 
Van Kouwenhoven (1991, 27) describes PPP as an inter-organizational phenomenon. 
It is a form of joint management via public-private networks. In achieving their aims, 
the parties in the network take account of the strategic behaviour of other actors and 
adapt their actions accordingly. The strategic variation in the network varies between 
the extremes of collaboration and rivalry. In a situation characterized by rational 
action, the actors do not succeed in harmonizing their own interests with those of the 
other actors. Each party strives to optimize its own interests. We have based this paper 
on the following definition of PPP, which includes certain elements of the definitions 
outlined above (see also Edelenbos & Klijn, forthcoming): “PPP consists of 
sustainable cooperation between public and private actors, who develop mutual 
products and/or services, and who share risks, costs and benefits”. PPP involves 
collaboration between public and private parties that focuses on achieving a common 
aim, which will in its turn, enhance the benefits of that collaboration.  
 
Arrangements of public-private partnerships 
In practice, a wide variety of coproductive arrangements can be found. In the 
literature a well-known distinction is made between the “concession” and “alliances” 
models, which are described below. 
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long-term exploitation rights (the concession) for a lump sum. According to the 
European Public Works Contracts Directive 93/37/EEG, a concession is a work order. 
This directive applies to agreements between governments and market partners 
concerning construction, infrastructural and hydraulic engineering works. Usually, 
however, this involves integrated (construction) projects. As it becomes increasingly 
possible to integrate project components into the market, and the more that integration 
improves, the greater the transfer of risk. Agreements about risk-sharing and task-
sharing are set out in the concession. 
Whether or not the government performs a participatory role in these projects will 
depend on the degree of risk transfer. In cases of complete risk transfer, the 
government acts as a facilitator by lending its cooperation to zoning schemes, or by 
granting exploitation rights (rental of the land or water needed). 
In many cases, the government stipulates an interest of its own in the framework of its 
role as a facilitator. For instance, in exchange for granting the long-term exploitation 
right to a facility, the government may require transfer of the title to itself following 
completion. The duration of concessions makes them very attractive to market parties. 
The potential financial gains in the long term motivate the parties involved to contain 
costs and work efficiently. 
The concession model is frequently associated with what is termed “innovative 
contracting out.” This can take various forms (Savas: 2000):  
1.  Design-Build contract: The private sector produces the design for a public 
project and constructs it.  
2. Design-Build-Finance-Maintenance  contract: In addition to the design and 
construction, the private sector also provides the financing, maintenance and 
management for the public facility. The government retains the title to the 
facility.  
3.  Build-Operate-Transfer contract: The private sector builds the facility and runs 
its operations for the duration of the contract. At the end of the contract period, 
the private party transfers the management of the facility to the government. 
4. Build-Operate-Own-Transfer contract: Comparable to BOT, but with the 
understanding that the private sector will hold the title to the facility for the 
entire period of the contract and will only transfer that title to the government 
once the contract expires. This type of contract is often used in concessions. 
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The alliance model is a form of cooperation characterized by intense involvement on 
the part of the government in the different phases of the project. The government may 
lend its cooperation to joint planning and development, or may work with several 
initiators to achieve objectives within a cohesive framework. Involving private parties 
at an early stage in the planning can lead to synergy effects and enhance results. This 
is because the sharing of resources, expertise and market knowledge can improve both 
the quality and effectiveness of the final product. 
In many cases, public-private partnership is the only project development option 
available. In these cases, the parties are more or less dependent on each other. The 
parties need to be able to agree on a plan for the contents of the project components. 
This complicates cooperation. At the same time, however, it is what constitutes the 
added value the collaboration model offers. The parties make agreements about the 
rules governing their conduct and the framework for their cooperation. The partners 
can also complement each other. A local authority, for example, may have sufficient 
knowledge of the local land market, but lack commercial insight when it comes to 
selling or leasing real estate. An important aim for local authorities is to guarantee 
quality standards, specifically for the projects intended in the planning area and the 
methods chosen to incorporate plans into public space. 
The selection of a particular form of contract depends on the complexity of 
implementation and the risk borne by the government. To keep these plans under 
control, local authorities exercise statutory instruments. These instruments include 
their powers to set up zoning schemes or grant planning permission, although this 
offers no guarantee of spatial quality. Private law instruments can be used to this end.  
Construction can, for instance, be supervised by a civil engineer and commissioning 
can be executed jointly. Certainly in cases where several building projects are 
underway, as with an area development project, the task of commissioning should not 
necessarily fall entirely to local authorities. The statuary instruments of zoning 
schemes and planning permission could slow down the progress of the project. 
Zoning schemes are intended primarily for excluding certain combinations of 
functions. This makes them more of an obstacle to achieving spatial quality than a 
means to it (Teisman, 2001). The partnership construction can take the form of a legal 
person in which the local authority participates with one or more private parties. In 
this case, the local authority would perform the commissioning role jointly with the 
  8private parties and could, if necessary, influence the quality of the construction 
project. The difference between the concession and alliance models is summarized in 
the table below (see also Klijn/Teisman, 2003; Van Ham and Koppenjan, 2002)
1: 
 
Table Public-private partnership in the concession and alliance models 
 
Characteristics  PPP seen as concession model  PPP seen as alliance model 
Type of relation / 
partnership between the 
PPP partners 
Clear distinction between 
commissioner (public party) and 
contractor (private party). 
 
Cooperation limited 
predominantly to the phase 
preceding the contracting out. 
This is followed by 
control/supervision of the private 
actor carried out solely by the 
public actor, with little or no 
mutual interaction. 
Government and private party are 
jointly involved in the design, 
construction and operation based 
on joint commissioning status. 
 
Collaboration continues 
throughout the whole process. 
Initially, it focuses on the nature of 
goals and the search for 
connections. Later, it is geared 
towards joint realization of goals.  
Role of contract in the 
establishment and 
running of the PPP 
Strong emphasis on (the use of) 
contracts to inject clarity and 
certainty into the collaboration. 
Less emphasis on (inspecting 
compliance with) contract. More 
emphasis on mutual trust. 
Determining the issues 
and direction of 
solutions for the project 
The public party (largely) 
defines and specifies the 
problem and the solutions. 
The public and private parties are 
involved in a joint process of 
defining problems and solutions. 
Scope of the project  Tendency to look for clear 
distinctions and boundaries. Any 
broadening of scope should take 
place within demarcated areas of 
responsibility. 
Tendency to seek expansion of 
scope and, from the perspective of 
coherence, laying connections 
between substantive elements 
within the project. 
Management principles 
upheld in the 
establishment and 
running of the PPP 
Strongly founded on principles 
of project management: specify / 
distinguish clear objectives, set 
out schedules and supervise 
them, and organize human 
resources. 
Founded more on principles of 
process management: goal-oriented 
operation, development of a solid 
cooperation process (rules, roles) 
and efforts to interconnect goals. 
 
In practice, there are also development company models that fit well into the alliance 
model described above. A Dutch example of this is the neighbourhood development 
company (Buurtontwikkelingsmaatschappij, or BOM) (Kouwenhoven, 1991). In this 
model, which is mainly used at local government level, the government is more open 
in involving its market partners in its programme of requirements. A neighbourhood 
development company is an umbrella organization for the development and support of 
projects aimed at stimulating economic activity in particular urban districts. The local 
                                                 
1 In practice there are also mixed forms. The distinction between concession and alliance models has analytical 
value. 
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contemporary perspective that advocates new forms of public-private relationships 
and greater responsibility for citizens regarding developments in their own town or 
city. Another Dutch example is the district development company 
(Wijkontwikkelingsmaatschappij, or WOM), which also operates mainly at a local 
government level. This is a legal form in which public and private parties 
accommodate an independent company (Hulshof & Kort, 2004). Collaboration here 
focuses on urban renewal and the improvement of the quality of city life by re-
structuring the living environment in existing districts. It is characterized by risk-
bearing public and private participation during the restructuring process and an 
integrated approach. 
 
How a PPP is established 
The decision to use a particular form of PPP collaboration takes shape during the 
different phases of the PPP’s establishment process. The following phases of PPP can 
be distinguished (Van Ham and Koppenjan, 2002, 22): 
 
 
A.  Setting up the PPP: 
1. Exploration 
i. Need  and  benefit 
ii. Social  costs 
iii. Budget  agreements 
2. Plan  development 
i.  Definition of design and output 
ii.  Establishing scope of objectives and preconditions 
iii. Financial  structure 
B.  Collaboration focused on (a part of) the project: 
3. Preparation 
i.  Further development of the plan 
ii. Procedural  agreements 
iii.  Contracting out strategy 
4. Implementation 
i.  Build and construction 
5.  Exploitation, maintenance and management 
i.  Assessment of whether or not to use a legal form 
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implementation, and, finally, exploitation, maintenance and management - is a 
frequently used division for PPP projects in area development and infrastructure. It 
should be mentioned here that the PPP phases have a strong dynamic; the 
establishment process shows an iterative character. 
Osborne and Murray (2000, 71) employ a model in which cooperation between the 
public and private parties is determined through a multi-phase process. Two important 
differences in the Osborne and Murray model are the division of the exploratory 
phase into three phases (“pre-contact phase”, “preliminary contact phase” and 
“negotiating phase”) and the identification of an evaluation phase following the 
implementation phase. During the evaluation phase, environmental factors and 
contextual factors that could disrupt collaboration are incorporated into the model. 
The most important function of the pre-contact phase is the careful weighing of the 
special interests of the parties and third parties involved in the public domain. The 
model focuses on the structure of organizational collaboration in terms of goals and 
the impact of this harmonization process on the collaboration. Negotiation tactics and, 
more importantly, the process agreements that the parties make with each other in the 
start phase determine the results of the process. These process agreements should be 
seen as steering arrangements that determine the context of PPP. The process 
approach in this model emphasizes the organizational dimension of a PPP. The way in 
which collaboration is organized is more or less the product of the negotiation and 
decision-forming processes. Osborne and Murray (2000,71) place greater emphasis on 
the interaction process and adequate harmonization and negotiation in the initiative 
and preparation phases. 
 
Managing PPP 
The basic principle of PPP is that of bringing and keeping together parties by creating 
a solid basis for sustainable collaboration. For Klijn and Teisman (2003), however, 
that is not so self-evident since interdependencies and the number and pluriformity of 
the participants can seriously complicate the collaboration. It is therefore necessary to 
actively facilitate the collaboration in the PPP. Management of PPPs can be 
approached from either of two perspectives – from the perspective of project 
management and the perspective of process management. These two management 
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2000; Teisman, 2001; Hertogh, 1997):  
 
Figure dimensions of project and process management 
 
Dimension Project  management Process  management 
Focus  A thoroughgoing analysis of the 
issues. Focuses on a sound, well 
substantiated project proposal. 
 
An analysis of the parties concerned, 
their interests, their means of 
exercising power, their views and 
mutual relationships. Focuses on the 
most important parties and how to 
bring and keep them together. 
Core element 
design  
An thorough solution for the problems  A description of the process, which is 




Through the content of the initiative: 
it should be so good it persuades 
everyone.  
Through the process: the relevant 
parties are allowed to influence the 
form of the initiative, which makes it 
more attractive for them.  
Dealing with 
dynamics 
Through decisiveness: rapid and clear 
decision-making, as a result of which 
changing circumstances have no hold 
on the initiative. 
By keeping options open: the 
initiative must remain attractive for 
the actors.  
 
Communication  Consists of explaining the plan to the 
actors and persuading them of its 
merits. This follows decision-making. 
 
Is a process of discussion and 
negotiation. Decision-making is the 
product of this.  
Main problem  Result is not sufficiently accepted  Creating acceptance via process and 
process rules takes time 
 
Process management is therefore different from project management (see also: 
Hertogh, 1997; De Bruijn et al., 2002). If project management is carried out, the 
process is divided into successive phases. Project management focuses strongly on 
managing the phases based on five aspects: quality of contents, costs, time, 
organization and information (Meredith, 2000; Mantel, 2005). Each phase transition is 
marked by a foundation document containing the results of the previous phase and 
describing the requirements and approach for the following phase. The results of each 
phase are tested against the foundation document. Project management focuses 
mainly on internal project management and less on continuing interaction with the 
environment. In a project approach, the assumption is that problems and solutions 
(within certain limits) are reasonably stable. This makes it possible to use project 
managerial techniques: a clear objective, a fixed schedule, clear preconditions and an 
end product agreed at the start. An approach of this sort could, of course, only work in 
a static world. 
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process approach is needed instead. This dynamic can have both external and internal 
causes (De Bruijn et al., 2004). It is evidence for external dynamic if an activity 
begins as a project but develops in to a process because external parties interfere with 
the project and simply introduce their own definitions of problems and solutions for 
them. A sign of an internal dynamic is that an activity begins as a project but develops 
into a process because the project owner learns during the project that the problem is 
wider or more complex than he had imagined.  
 
Process management, in contrast, is actually based on the assumption of dynamics and 
complexity in the interests and perspectives of many actors (Edelenbos, 2000; 
Teisman, 2001; De Bruijn et al., 2004). The problem is wicked and unstructured as a 
result of insufficient objective information and the absence of consensus about the 
norms to be upheld in defining problems and solving them. In addition, the parties 
have different perceptions of reality because they have not been involved in the 
decision-making process from the start. Process management sees problem solving as 
a continuous process in which the contribution of the parties’ own values and 
information creates greater consensus between them. This openness in decision- 
making creates respect for each other’s interests. 
An environment-oriented approach of allowing all interested parties to participate in 
the process on the basis of open dialog fits in with this point of view. Project 
management can nevertheless be useful in a particular round or period of a policy 
process because during the process quality of content (well-specified programme of 
requirements), quality control and similar), costs, time, organization and information 
need to be monitored. Through interaction between interested parties, the formulation 
of the problem becomes clearer and solutions are chosen and drawn up. This can be a 
different solution to the one the initiator had in mind at the start. In process 
management the premature declaration of a solution to a problem is discouraged 
because it denies the need to know all interests and, moreover, gives the impression 





  133.   Case study: PPP Sijtwende  
 
Historical overview 
The Sijtwende development project has a long history, even by Dutch standards. As 
long ago as 1938, plans had been drawn up for the construction of Highway 14 – a 
connection between what was then Highway 4 (now Highway 44) and Highway 4a 
(now Highway 4), which had not yet been built. The project involved considerable 
discord, even then. The Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 
was engaged in a bitter struggle with Voorburg, which opposed the construction of the 
link road, also known as the Verlengde Landscheidingweg, or VLW. The VLW lies to 
the north of Voorburg and forms part of the Northern Ring Road around The Hague 
(see Figure below).  
 




The conflict between the Ministry of Transport and the local authority reached its 
climax late in May 1988. The minister increased the pressure on Voorburg, 
threatening to punish any stubbornness on their part by having the provincial 
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zoning plan must be made to conform with the decision on the route for the road. 
Voorburg, however, allowed the Sijtwende plan to be developed further. Furthermore, 
it had a zoning plan prepared that conformed to this plan. The direction had failed to 
specify how the road should be laid.  
Voorburg eventually agreed to cooperate in the laying of the VLW, subject to certain 
conditions. In principle, however, it still opposed the project. This acquiescence, 
however, was linked (by means of the Sijtwende plan) to the requirement that the road 
should pass through a tunnel. With this plan accepted, the developer Bohemen BV, 
the tunnel builder Van Hattum and Blankevoort BV and building contractors v/h 
Boele & Van Eesteren entered the scene. This setup later gave rise to ‘Sijtwende BV’, 
which was formed from Volker Wessels Real Estate and Bohemen BV. During this 
process, Van Hattum and Blankevoort’s (VHB) role changed from that of developer 
to building contractor. Sijtwende BV delegated the design and implementation of the 
road to VHB. 
Initially reticent about the plan (due to its late timing) and seeing it as just one more 
delaying tactic from Voorburg, the ministry was worried that the plan was too far 
removed from the route decision. This, in turn, might well mean that a supplementary 
Environmental Impact Assessment would be necessary, with all the delays that would 
involve. The minister requested that the provincial government of Zuid-Holland 
should still proceed with issuing a direction to Voorburg. From that moment on 
Voorburg gambled everything on the Sijtwende plan. An important alteration was that 
the road no longer needed to be entirely underground, lying instead in what is called a 
“hollow dyke”, which would be much cheaper. 
The ministry became increasingly supportive of the Sijtwende plan. It was pleased 
with the breakthrough in the decades-long impasse and showed substantial interest in 
the innovative plan. As support for the plan increased, the ministry began to shift its 
focus to structuring the conditions for implementation. Amongst other things, a 
programme of requirements from the ministry and an urban development plan created 
by Sijtwende BV served as a model for the further elaboration of the Sijtwende plan. 
The starting point centred on urban planning, together with the technical and financial 
aspects, with the ministry acting as plan inspector. Although it had been invited to 
take part in the regular consultation about the zoning scheme for the Voorburg section 
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join the consultations in several project groups.  
In July 1996, Sijtwende BV, Voorburg, Haaglanden and the state signed a declaration 
of intent. This was followed by a four-party agreement in September of the same year. 
Then the direction procedure was halted and the ministry cancelled work on its own 
plan to lay the road at ground level, without building any housing estates. The four-
party agreement of September 1996 was further developed in June 1997 in a series of 
bilateral agreements between three of the four central stakeholders in the 
establishment process: Rijkswaterstaat, Sijtwende BV and Voorburg (see next section 
concerning details of the arrangements). In March 1997, the city council of Voorburg 
agreed to a partial revision of the Sijtwende zoning plan. In October 1997, this 
revision was approved by the Provincial Executive.  
On 13 January 1999, the minister of Transport officially initiated the proceedings for 
the project that is now referred to as Northern Ring Road and Sijtwende. This event 
marked the transition from the development phase of the Sijtwende plan to its 
implementation. The Sijtwende plan was finally implemented between 1999 and 
2003. By the end of 2003, the road was ready for opening. The implementation 
process went fairly smoothly, although some hurdles still had to be overcome (see 
section on process interventions). Following the plan’s completion, Sijtwende 
transferred the road to the ministry for management and maintenance. The public 
areas and buildings were transferred to Voorburg. 
 
Central actors in the game 
Four actors were involved in the process: the Ministry of Transport and Water 
Management (through the ministry’s Zuid-Holland Directorate, called 
“Rijkswaterstaat”), the Haaglanden metropolitan district, Voorburg, and the private 
consortium Sijtwende BV. Up to 1996, the process was characterized by ‘go it alone’ 
strategies from the parties concerned. The parties only began to work together 
following the mediation conducted by the private initiators of the Sijtwende plan. 
That moment marked the start of the public-private collaboration process, within 
which the four parties began to move in the same direction, and to jointly implement 
the Sijtwende plan. 
Rijkswaterstaat made the decision to implement the VLW. Rijkswaterstaat in 
particular saw the main arguments for laying the VLW as the reduction of congestion 
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development of the Sijtwende plan, Rijkswaterstaat gradually became enthusiastic 
about this solution and about a PPP approach and played a constructive role in setting-
up the PPP. 
Voorburg originally played a delaying and blocking role in the process. The local 
authority was not particularly inclined to cooperate in the road-building scheme. The 
road would have many adverse effects for Voorburg. People living nearby would 
suffer nuisance (noise, smell, visual pollution) from a ground-level road variant. 
Moreover, fitting in the VLW thwarted Voorburg’s plan to build houses in this area. 
The council took the view that the VLW’s drawbacks would be significantly 
ameliorated if the road were to be situated underground. During the development of 
the Sijtwende plan, the council also became enthusiastic about this solution. It 
subsequently made an important contribution to the establishment of the PPP. The 
involvement of Haaglanden with Sijtwende derived mainly from the task of 
developing public transport around the Hague.  
Sijtwende BV’s role in the process was multifaceted. In the plan development phase, 
it acted as the director and driving force behind the collaboration process. Of all the 
parties involved, the private consortium had the greatest interest in maintaining the 
process of interaction. Sijtwende BV had a complete overview of the Sijtwende plan 
and of the developments in the process. On the basis of this, it organized the public-
private collaboration process between Haaglanden, Voorburg, Rijkswaterstaat and 
itself. 
Sijtwende BV played various roles in the PPP. First of all, it took up the role of 
initiator and developer for the Sijtwende plan. The framework drawn up by the 
Ministry of Transport and Voorburg offers Sijtwende BV sufficient scope to further 
improve matters. Secondly, Sijtwende BV is co-financier of the plan. The state is 
contributing towards the cost of the road, but the remaining aspects of the project are 
being financed by receipts from the sale of homes and offices in the immediate 
vicinity of the tunnel. Sijtwende BV is wholly responsible for this integrated 
development. The latter was also responsible for all the necessary licences and an 
important part of the harmonization (communication) with the area surrounding the 
plan. Finally, Sijtwende BV implemented the Sijtwende plan. To some extent, these 
roles would normally fall to Rijkswaterstaat and Voorburg respectively. 
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of roles between the actors involved. Rijkswaterstaat, for example, is accustomed to 
acting as plan designer, while here it acted primarily as a plan inspector and upholder 
of quality. Rijkswaterstaat monitored the design and construction process at a 
distance, a process which involved the close coordination of road building and 
housing development. The role of Rijkswaterstaat was deliberately changed from 
close supervision to one of supervision at arm’s length. It is not accustomed to such 
an approach. Rijkswaterstaat is also used to reasoning on the basis of its objective, 
which is to lay the road. Additionally, it tests and inspects the design and finished 
product against a variety of criteria, including the programme of requirements. The 
Rijkswaterstaat Construction Service (Bouwdienst van Rijkswaterstaat) oversees the 
actual implementation of the road. After completion, Rijkswaterstaat takes control of 
the road. 
 
Perceptions of problems and solutions 
Each of the various actors defines the problem that the VLW is intended to solve in 
their own individual way. The Ministry of Transport and Water Management 
emphasizes the problems of traffic jams and congestion on The Hague ring road. A 
new northern ring road including the VLW can help to solve this problem. The 
problem is thus defined in terms of accessibility. 
The municipality of Voorburg mainly highlights the problem of nuisance if the VLW 
were to be built at ground level. People living nearby would experience nuisance 
(noise, smells and obstruction) from the VLW. The council itself would also be 
inconvenienced, as this would interfere with its plans to build new houses on the land 
in question. Voorburg was unable to understand why it was necessary for the 
connection from Leidscheveen to pass through its territory. It made a counter proposal 
that the road should be laid mainly through Leidscheveen. The Ministry of Transport 
and Water Management, however, envisaged technical problems with this approach, 
such as the need to retain the Vliet bridges. Voorburg repeatedly proposed the option 
of a sunken road, or one that was completely underground. This, however, would 
have involved additional costs that the ministry was not prepared to bear. Nor did the 
council have the necessary funds. Given these cost considerations, the ministry 
proposed that the road be built at ground level. Eventually it came round to the idea of 
a sunken design, since this was the only way to get Voorburg on board for the 
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delay or block the VLW, but actually to push forward with its implementation. 
The private consortium Sijtwende BV then put forward its ‘hollow dyke’ solution, the 
Sijtwende plan, which safeguarded the interests of the Ministry of Transport and those 
of the council. The hollow dyke, which rises six meters above ground level, is both 
soundproof and landscaped. The Sijtwende plan involves a two-kilometre length of 
road that would be mostly covered by three lengths of hollow dyke (measuring 1,000 
metres, 275 metres and 375 metres respectively). Between the three covered sections 
there would be two junctions. Covering the road in this way would increase the 22 
hectares available for housing and office building in the area to a functionally useable 
area of 27 hectares. This multiple exploitation of the area provided financial 
compensation for the relatively expensive hollow dyke version of the VLW. A High-
Grade Public Transport Link (Hoogwaardige Openbaar Vervoerverbinding) will be 
built alongside the road. About 700 new homes will be built on either side, some of 
them directly adjoining the dyke, but none will be situated directly on top of this 
structure. The plan also includes about 10,000 square metres of office space and the 
building of a recreational area, green space and leisure facilities. 
Rijkswaterstaat will take over the road from Sijtwende BV for a previously agreed 
sum. It then becomes responsible for the management and maintenance of the road. 
Sijtwende contributes a sum - also previously agreed - to the road from the housing 
construction receipts. The total finance for the road also includes contributions from 
other parties – the Ministry for Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 
(VROM) is contributing from a reserve for emergency roads for Leidschenveen. 
Haaglanden bears the costs of the High-Grade Public Transport Link. 
 
In its specific role of process manager, Sijtwende BV has been keenly aware of the 
interests of the actors involved from the very start of the collaboration process. The 
plan finally revealed its multiple ‘win-win’ character - it combined the laying of a 
highway (the interest of Rijkswaterstaat, the provincial government and the 
municipality) with new housing along the route (a long-standing objective of 
Voorburg) and the reduction of nuisance from the new road for people living nearby. 
Additionally, Haaglanden Metropolitan District gets the public transport link it 
wanted. In other words, a range of interests was combined in one multifacetted 
solution.  
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its integrated approach, its financial feasibility, the multiple use of space and the 
urban development. Such was the success of this approach that it swiftly gained the 
backing of the local councils at the Hague and Leidschendam. This was subject to two 
conditions. The work on the Sijtwende alternative should not lead to delays (a 
condition imposed both by the Hague and by Leidschendam) and plans to improve the 
future accessibility of Leidschenveen should involve an appropriate degree of 
sensitivity (a condition imposed by Leidschendam). 
In the plan development phase Sijtwende BV handled the collaboration between the 
public and private parties, and acted as mediator and facilitator of the PPP. Firstly, in 
consultation with Voorburg, Sijtwende BV ensured that the zoning procedure went by 
the book. Various other stakeholders (such as social interest groups and individuals 
living nearby) were involved in this in an informal way (through sounding-board 
groups) as well as in formal ways (through formal public enquiry procedures). 
Sijtwende BV also facilitated the collaboration process between the Haaglanden 
Metropolitan District, Rijkswaterstaat and Voorburg. Because they were not linked to 
the turbulent history of the project, they were able to take a reconciliatory stance in 
their interactions with others. Sijtwende also ensured that the plan development 
connected both with the formal decision / decision-making of the Ministry of 
Transport (MER/Tracéwetgeving) and with the formal procedure for Voorburg’s 
zoning plan modifications. Finally, the multiple-roles adopted by Sijtwende BV led 
other parties to take on more constructive roles. Rijkswaterstaat assumed the role of 
plan inspector and co-developer, rather than that of plan implementer. Voorburg also 
adopted a more constructive role, instead of that of the classic opponent.  
In the implementation phase, which began in 1999, Sijtwende BV (as developer) 
distanced itself more and more from the role of process facilitator. Van Hattum and 
Blankevoort (as part of Sijtwende BV) became more active as the road’s construction 
supervisor. This was partly the result of the contract structure: one single blanket 
partnership agreement between all parties supplemented with elaboration in bilateral 
agreements. In concrete terms, this means that the area development (housing plus 
public space) is mainly a matter for Sijtwende BV and Voorburg. The construction of 
the road mainly involves VHB (operating under the name of Sijtwende BV) and 
Rijkswaterstaat. No central project organization (involving all parties) was created to 
bring all bilateral relations together under a single umbrella organization. 
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Structure of mutual agreements 
In July 1996, Sijtwende BV, Voorburg, Haaglanden and the state jointly signed a 
declaration of intent, followed in September the same year by a four-party agreement. 
The latter covered the construction of the new Sijtwende housing estate, together with 
the Northern By-Pass. The agreement included the intent to build, on a limited spatial 
site, a link road between the Hague and the A4 motorway at Leidschendam, in 
addition to which a high-quality housing estate would be built and provided with a 
High-Value Public Transport Link (Hoogwaardige Openbaar Vervoerverbinding or 
HOV). The four parties each have their own interests and responsibilities. 
Rijkswaterstaat is responsible for laying the road, the Ministry for Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment for the opening up of Leidschenveen, Voorburg for a 
high-quality housing estate, Haaglanden for the HOV and Sijtwende BV for the 
implementation of the overall plan (road, HOV, housing and offices). The financing 
of the Sijtwende plan is shared by the parties involved in accordance with their 
responsibilities. 
The four-party agreements of September 1996 was further developed in June 1997. 
This involved a series of bilateral agreements between three of the four central 
stakeholders in the establishment process, namely Rijkswaterstaat, Sijtwende BV and 
Voorburg. The process involved negotiating the detailed contents of the plan. 
The bilateral agreement between Sijtwende BV and Rijkswaterstaat is primarily 
concerned with the construction of the tunnel and the necessary functional 
requirements for the road (headroom, width of carriageway, markings, hard shoulders, 
etc). The agreement between Sijtwende BV and Voorburg mainly dealt with the 
layout of the housing adjoining the hollow dyke. The agreement between the ministry 
and Voorburg mainly concerned the planned location of Sijtwende - primarily a 
question of filling in the zoning plan. Haaglanden was also involved, albeit at arm’s 
length. The metropolitan district’s involvement included agreements about its 
financial contribution to the HOV link (via the Ministry of Transport). It also made 
agreements with Voorburg about the planned placement of the HOV link. 
The bilateral discussions surrounding all agreements were of a legal nature. Lawyers 
were constantly involved in the consultation rounds, as agreements went back and 
forth, and contracts were signed. The purpose of sharing joint contracts is to give the 
other parties a rolling overview of what is being arranged. Sijtwende BV implemented 
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The sharing of cost and risks is set out in the contract. The risks lie primarily with the 
private consortium that is implementing the road on a turnkey basis, i.e. for a set price 
and within previously agreed functional and technical frameworks. An acceptance 
procedure for constituent products ensures that the development of the definitive 
design, the constituent designs and any necessary further agreed enhancements fall 
within the conditions of the programme of requirements. Should there be a difference 
of opinion, the parties consult a primacy, within which sit the directors and the heads 
of the parties. A board of experts was formed to settle disputes. 
 
Rijkswaterstaat aims at careful contract management, for which purpose it has 
formulated a number of measures. Firstly, a programme of requirements should be put 
together so as to be as clear and functional as possible. Preparation and 
implementation take place under external quality assurance. Sijtwende BV reports 
periodically to Rijkswaterstaat. Constituent products, acceptance procedures and 
milestones are specified. The payment schedule is synchronized to the acceptance of 
the constituent products. There is a system of fines for failures to reach milestones. 
In the period of plan development, there was continuous and multilateral consultation 
between the various parties. Sijtwende BV’s part in this was mainly to initiate and 
coordinate, in the role of process manager (see section Arrangements of public-private 
partnership for the central issues).  
The implementation phase of the plan involves contact between Sijtwende BV and 
Rijkswaterstaat, particularly in thematic terms. Rijkswaterstaat checks the 
implementation of the plan against elements such as the previously formulated 
programme of requirements and its elaboration in the final designs. Sijtwende is paid 
when it achieves previously stipulated milestones in the implementation phase.  
 
Interventions in the collaboration process 
Process interventions occurred during the development of the plan (when setting-up 
the public-private collaboration) and in during implementation of the plan (when the 
collaboration is in operation). 
The initiators work from mandatory requirements for an ‘urban tunnel’. They adapted 
the dimensions of the tunnel to a maximum speed of 50 kph. In this plan, the ground 
level tunnel is open at two points, to allow for level road junctions (these were laid 
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Rijkswaterstaat took the view that this did not meet road safety requirements, as the 
tunnel openings are situated too close to the junctions. This excessively restricts 
drivers’ lines of sight as they leave the tunnel. In addition, previous research by the 
ministry had shown that, in terms of traffic flow, roundabouts were not the best option 
for these junctions. The discussion was hampered by the fact that traffic safety 
regulations are only partially embodied in ‘quantitative’ regulations. Accordingly, 
assessment must be mainly based on practical experience. 
In order to reach a common agreed starting point for traffic safety, the Technical 
Human Biology Group of the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific 
Research (TNO-Technische Menskunde) was asked to use virtual simulations to see 
which technical requirements are required to meet the need for safety. The study 
showed that the tunnel should open up at a greater distance from the junctions, all the 
more because the road had to be designed for a maximum speed of 70 kph. These 
adjustments to the plan had the effect of reducing the number of homes that can be 
built from about 1,000 in the original plan to about 700. The larger gaps in the tunnel 
result in a larger ‘noise space’, which cannot be used for the construction of homes. 
This naturally has financial consequences for the plan as a whole, although the lower 
revenues from housing construction are partly offset by the reduced costs of shorter 
tunnels. 
 
During the implementation phase, collaboration between the private and public parties 
was initially successful. The desire to make a success of the PPP ensured that people 
were prepared to take the usual bumps and potholes in their stride. There were, 
however, points of friction and differences of opinion in the collaboration. With 
respect to the construction of the tram tunnel there were problems in the collaboration 
between Haaglanden Metropolitan District and Sijtwende BV. At the Van Steelaan 
(one of the junctions in the Sijtwende plan) there was originally to be a crossing with 
a tramline at ground level. However, at the start of the implementation phase of 
Sijtwende it became clear that a tram tunnel would be needed for a good flow of all 
the traffic at the junction. The design changes required by the metropolitan district 
had financial consequences, particularly because the construction time became longer 
and introduced higher costs. This ‘intervention’ (in terms of time and money) led to a 
good deal of unrest in the PPP. It came down to whether or not to incorporate the 
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legal advice, decided to contract-out the project rather than have it built by one of the 
PPP partners. A public contracting-out of the project and not to have it carried out by 
one of the PPP partners – and dealing with the extra costs that the tunnel adds to the 
project.  
In 2002 an understanding was reached. Haaglanden would bear the net extra costs of 
the tram tunnel to the Sijtwende project. However, working out the details of this 
agreement of principles led to a discussion that raged for about a year. This concerned 
the specification of the net extra costs for Sijtwende. 
  
Another point of discussion in the implementation of the Sijtwende plan concerned 
the parking garage at the Vliettoren apartments in Subdivision 5 (realization of 
aqueduct). In the original plans, Sijtwende BV worked from the assumption of an 
underground parking garage against the tunnel wall. This possibility was subjected to 
a technical study by Rijkswaterstaat. The resulting report concluded that, although it 
was technically possible to put the parking garage against the tunnel wall, this would 
entail relatively expensive additional provisions. In saying this, Rijkswaterstaat 
intended to keep open the option open for a garage next to the tunnel. Sijtwende BV 
however saw it as meaning that it was no longer realistic to have a garage next to the 
tunnel. 
The alternative solution of a parking garage on the roof of the tunnel led to 
negotiations between Rijkswaterstaat and Sijtwende BV that lasted about two years, 
during which both parties stuck quite rigidly to their starting positions. 
Rijkswaterstaat finally made an exception to its principle that nothing should be built 
on, over or above the road while Sijtwende BV accepted the costs for the extra 
provisions for this and other parking garages.  
After finally reaching agreement about having the parking garage on the tunnel roof, 
Sijtwende BV were presented with a bill they hadn’t expected from Domeinen, 
Ministry of Finance for the use of public space. The Ministry of Transport had 
pointed out right at the start of the discussion about this solution that this would have 
to be paid for.  
The bill from Domeinen (an annual rent that can be bought out for € 200,000) was a 
reason for Sijtwende BV to reconsider its intention to build the parking garage on the 
tunnel roof. In the context of this reconsideration, Sijtwende (again) examined the 
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implementing the original plan – an underground garage next to the road – was after 
all possible if relatively simple, though not necessarily cheap, provisions could be 
made to the aqueduct. Rijkswaterstaat, however, pointed out that the necessary 
provisions would actually cost more than the one-off payment to Domeinen. 
As a result of previous ‘disappointments’ Sijtwende BV made a decision about the 
parking garage. There were two schools of thought within Sijtwende BV. Some 
thought that the garage should go on the tunnel roof despite the higher costs. This 
would be a striking example of the multiple use of space and would make it easier in 
other (future) projects to make use of the space over or above highways for urban 
development. But there was also the view that the advantages of a garage above the 
road could not justify its higher costs. On top of that, a parking garage directly under 
the apartments offered certain advantages - social safety, for example. Sijtwende BV 
eventually decided to build the garage under the Vliettoren apartments, although it 
was seen by Sijtwende BV as a missed chance for a recognizable and striking 
example of the integrated nature of the Sijtwende plan, namely a garage on the tunnel. 
Sijtwende concluded that the Ministry of Transport was responsible for the financial 
consequences of the decision to build the parking garage under the Vliettoren 
apartments. In the view of Sijtwende BV, this consisted of a reduction in the 
exploitation revenues (fewer apartments can be created in the Vliettoren). In addition, 
the designs had to be changed. Sijtwende BV informed the ministry about this, which 
then accepted no liabilities for the financial consequences regarding the parking 
garage. As a result of this reaction, Sijtwende BV submitted a claim that caused the 
relationship between Sijtwende BV and Rijkswaterstaat to sour. 
 
 
4.  Case analysis: project management versus process management 
 
Sijtwende is something of a special case. It resulted from a long-term inter-
administrative conflict between the Voorburg, which put up stiff resistance against a 
planning intervention and the Ministry of Transport, which championed a ground 
level variant of the new Verlengde Landscheidingsweg highway. This conflict lasted 
60 years. The partnership, therefore, seems to represent a peculiar breakthrough in a 
public-public controversy.  
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process manager capable of achieving reconciliation, able to break through the 
barriers between public organizations. At the same time, it played its role as a project 
manager, in the sense that it developed a creative and innovative multifunctional land 
use plan.  
At the same time, Sijtwende is a more general case. Following the remarkable 
breakthrough, implementation commenced. And during the implementation we see 
ambivalence developing in the combination of project- and process management. We 
will elaborate upon these tensions, which hinder an ongoing process of co-production. 
 
At the start of the PPP (period 1996 - 1999), the private initiators are real co-
production oriented process managers (the project organization Sijtwende B.V. was 
one of the results). The initiators took an active steering role in the process. They 
brought public organizations and leaders together. They can be seen as account 
managers in the process.  
However, to the extent that the implementation of the Sijtwende plan progressed 
(after 1999) the relationships took on a more bilateral character: diverging issues were 
discussed and solved within various bilateral relationships. This shift from network 
and process management to bilateral relation management can be explained from the 
bilateral contracts that were made in the first period of development. The contract 
structure was one of a single comprehensive co-production contract between all 
parties involved, supplemented with working-out in bilateral agreements. The area 
development (housing and public space) was, in particular, a matter between 
Sijtwende BV and Voorburg, while the realisation of the road was a matter between 
Van Hattum and Blankevoort (on behalf of Sijtwende BV) on the one hand and 
Rijkswaterstaat on the other. 
These contracts create a bilateral game. To a large extent this seems to have been 
efficient. A less desirable outcome, however, was the reversal of the integrated plan: 
Sijtwende B.V. lost its role as process manager. A conscious decision was made not 
to set up a common central project organization. Voorburg, Rijkswaterstaat and 
Haaglanden wanted an arm’s length role in the PPP because, as external parties, they 
would be in a better position to secure public interests and not to simply act from the 
interest of the project itself. 
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organization - in which the total plan and the proposed interim changes in the 
implementation could have been discussed - has been possible. In a joint project 
organization - if necessary, under the leadership of an independent processes manager 
- certain problems probably could have been discussed earlier or approached more 
from the point of view of the interests of the project (e.g. speed in decision-making, 
cost containment, integration of housing and road). In a joint project organization a 
process manager might have been able to do more in terms of relation management. 
Because the various project components were mostly discussed and resolved in 
bilateral discussions and negotiations, the parties gradually began to feel exclusively 
responsible for that part of the Sijtwende project where they are most involved with 
the implementation. This was more the case during the implementation of the project 
than during the development of the plan. So, for instance, Rijkswaterstaat felt most 
responsible for the road and less so for the housing in the overall plan. Haaglanden 
also showed exclusive responsibility in the process, namely for the tram tunnel 
crossing - despite the fact that this, strictly speaking, was not part of the Sijtwende 
plan. The primary interests of the council lay with housing and the layout of the 
public space. 
As the plan development and implementation progressed, the sense of common 
responsibility for the totality of the Sijtwende project gradually declined. The parties 
concentrated on a particular part of the plan at the expense of the overall plan. This is 
an explanation for the failure of the Sijtwende plan to develop a more strongly 
multiple land use character during the implementation. In some areas, parties refused 
to participate on the basis of joint responsibility for the overall plural plan. Strikingly, 
the parties themselves evaded joint responsibility while expecting it from the partners 
for the part for which they were themselves mainly responsible. The parties look for 
certainty and security through a clear separation of tasks, competences and 
responsibilities. The parking garage at the Vliettoren and the intervention over the 
tram tunnel show this happening. This way of working is consistent with the set-up of 
the Sijtwende PPP (in the contract Sijtwende BV is clearly handed the role of 
developer and leader; there is thus a clear and conscious decision not to have a 
common commissionership), but it is hard to see it as being consistent with the 
principles of process management, in which common commissionership and joint 
responsibility are precisely the things that are needed. 
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We can ascertain that the way of working described above, from a perspective of 
separation of tasks and responsibilities, has had a hindering effect on, particularly, the 
development and intensification of collaborative relations, but perhaps also on the 
further strengthening of the cohesion and multiple land use character of the plan. 
When the plan went from development to implementation there was a noticeable 
switch from a process-based approach (with the plan development) to a project-based 
approach (with the plan implementation). The implementation phase of the Sijtwende 
project was strongly directed at internal project control in terms of costs, time and 
information. Plans were split up into sub-projects that had to be carried-out separately. 
There was mainly attention for quality control and containing costs and time with 
respect to the sub-projects. There is less attention, other than in the period of plan 
development, for the continuous interaction between stakeholders and the dynamics 
of the plan. In this scheme of things too little account seems to be taken of the 
changeability of plans; plans must sometimes, under the influence of unexpected 
developments, be modified during the implementation. For this to work, there must be 
continuous consultation and interaction, and this has to be organized. The 
organization of the PPP in the implementation was less well equipped for this. 
During the implementation, circumstances changed in such a way, and interventions 
such as the Vliettoren parking garage occurred, such as to cause diversions from the 
original designs. During the plan development, the parties involved sought together 
for creative solutions. When it came to accommodating unforeseen developments 
during the implementation there was, however, less evidence of a common approach. 
The implementation of the project, including the collaboration, went more or less 
smoothly. The process interventions that did occur during the implementation came 
mainly from new and unexpected developments. The designs for both the area 
development (Definitive Urban Development Design) and the road (Definitive 
Design) can be found in the initial collaboration contracts. During the implementation 
- as happens in area development and infrastructure projects - situations emerged that 
forced changes in the original designs. 
It is precisely in those places in the development of the Sijtwende plan where the 
parties involved have sought together for creative solutions that, when it comes to 
accommodating the effects of unforeseen circumstances, a common approach was less 
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parties try to take on as little as possible of the responsibility and its associated risks.  
This expectant attitude came partly from the collaborative relationships. These are, 
consciously and, in the context of the initiative phase, maybe even necessarily, mainly 
bilateral and directed at specific parts of the overall project. It is consequently not 
obviously of common interest that problems that occur during the implementation 
should be tackled jointly. 
 
In the Sijtwende case the transition from plan development to plan implementation 
was marked by a transition from a process-based approach to a project-based one. We 
would not like to imply that the project-based approach should not have been 
followed and that only a process-based approach should have been used. We would 
rather say that there should have been a conscious decision for a workable mixture of 
the two approaches, even in the implementation phase. 
Also, in public-private collaboration the balance can overshoot towards project-based 
operation, while little attention is given for the possibilities offered by a process-based 
approach. In the implementation phase a certain degree of process management is 
always necessary in order to keep and eye on changing needs, requirements and 
technical possibilities and in order to safeguard the cohesion and integrated nature of 
the overall project. The solution that has now been realized is of course a textbook 
example of integrated development and multiple land use. Yet it is still uncertain as to 
whether the final solution could have had a more integrated character if, during the 
implementation, people had been able to keep more of an open mind as to the benefits 
of seeking creative solutions with each other. It is not easy to answer this question 
because the project-based approach greatly contributed to the fact that - although the 
laying of the VLW had for years been a complex and sensitive issue - the Sijtwende 
plan was actually implemented and the PPP functioned right to the very end to the 
satisfaction of all parties involved, as they claim themselves. 
 
 
5.   Conclusion and discussion 
 
The theories about and the practice of management in urban areas draw a clear 
distinction between project management and process management. In several cases, 
  29we see that project management is geared more towards the realisation of a fixed 
project, whereas process managers focus more on mutual enrichment of the 
proposition. It is our understanding that both approaches are needed in order to create 
an efficient and effective process of co-production. Any one-sided approach, whether 
it is purely project-orientated or process-orientated, can easily create obstacles in the 
process of co-production. Effective combinations of project and process management 
are needed in order to implement multiple land-use development projects.  
The Sijtwende case offers an example of a crucial breakthrough in a public-private 
conflict: here, private companies prove extraordinarily successful in implementing 
process management intervention. The private consortium also supervised a high 
quality project development.  
During the implementation phase, however, the balances shifted towards a one-sided 
project approach. The process management approach was forgotten, which had clearly 
adverse effects. Cooperation between parties became more of a struggle, and co-
production (in terms of ongoing care for quality improvement for the entire area) 
almost disintegrated. 
Theorists interested in the management of multifunctional investment programs at the 
interface between the public and private sectors and between different jurisdictions 
must develop theories on how to combine process and project management 
effectively. The former has added value in terms of ongoing quality improvement for 
several actors. The latter offers added value in terms of efficient realisation.  
In practice, the project managers’ task orientation (i.e. that of ensuring the success of 
an investment) will constantly interfere with the way process managers interact 
(looking for added value throughout all development phases and for all actors 
involved). Combining both forms of management in an efficient way can undoubtedly 
be seen as a core issue in realizing multiple land use. 
This is a core issue because differences in the style process management and project 
management often create a clumsy, dubious impression. In other words, it is difficult 
for the actors in the direct environment to accept that no further enrichment will be 
permitted following a period of enrichment and expansion. It is also difficult for them 
to accept that everything will suddenly become negotiable again and that there will be 
no consolidation of past achievements. 
Project management and process management must both be adapted and extended 
throughout the collaboration process. The project manager will focus on the task of 
  30realizing a – technical – investment. The process manager, in turn, will concentrate on 
generating support, enthusiasm and positive associations for a socially relevant 
investment. The exploration of new possibilities and the admission of new parties, 
ideas and interests all play an important role in this. Administrative clients should try 
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